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Two Views of Non-Voting: A Critique 
STEPHEN L. WASBY 
Sowhern Illinois University, Carbondale 
ABSTRACT - The view that non-voting is bad is contrasted with the view that non-voting can be 
functional for a political system. Works by Schattschneider and Berelson et al. are examined. 
Limitations in their arguments are pointed out, particularly the farmer's assertion that non-voters 
are being manipulated and the letters' emphasis on the short-run aspects of the system. The 
arguments are related to traditional conceptions of democracy. 
This paper is an attempt to examine some views of the 
phenomenon of non-voting in the United States. The 
views of two political scientists who assumed what are 
essentiaUy opposing positions on the value of non-voting 
were chosen for examination. In addition, one repre-
sented a traditional approach to the subject and the 
other, a more sociological or "behavioral" position. The 
two writers are E. E. Schattschneider and Bernard Berel-
son; their arguments are abstracted from The Semi-Sov-
ereign People (1960) and Voting (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, 
and McPhee, 1954), respectively. This paper is princi-
pally a review essay and critique, not a presentation of 
new data, although hopefully the analysis may stimulate 
some new explorations of non-voting. 
In their discussions of non-voting and its conse-
quences, both Schattschneider and Berelson et al. were 
concerned with the ability of democratic political sys-
tems to cope with problems created by internal system 
frictions and the external political environment. Each 
discussed at length the implications of the high rate of 
non-voting in the United States. While more or less con-
cerned with the same problem, the two evaluated non-
voting in quite different ways. Schattschneider basica1Iy 
said it is "bad," or at least "not good," while Berelson 
indicated that non-voting (at least within certain unspec-
ified limits, or unaccompanied by complete dissatisfac-
tion with the system) can be, and is, functional for the 
democratic system. Both agreed that there is "unused po-
litical potential" within the system. They disagreed , how-
ever, on whether it should be used and, if so, when and 
how. 
The Basic Views 
Schattschneider began his argument by distinguishing 
between the roughly 60 million voters and the 40 million 
non-voters, asserting that a curtain, although a "tissue-
paper curtain," separates the two groups. Assuming that 
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the two groups differ considerably in political leaning, he 
argued that "the addition of forty million voters ( or any 
major fraction of them) would make a tremendous dif-
ference" ( Schattschneider, 1960: 103) in the world of 
politics. Schattschneider continually emphasized the 
"blackout of the forty million," which shows the "pro-
found contradiction between theory and practice" in 
democracy. This non-participation is the "sickness of de-
mocracy." Although at one point he said that non-voting 
seems to be "voluntary," he later argued predominantly 
that non-voters are excluded from participation by invis-
ible processes. 
In the past, he wrote, the expansion of the electorate 
was a function of party conflict and a result of changes 
in public policy. Now the struggle had ceased to be over 
the right to vote; it was, rather, over the "organization 
of politics." The latter is quite important to meaningful 
politics, Schattschneider said, because, even though the 
formal right to vote is given, the vote can be made quite 
meaningless through the existence of obstacles to organ-
ization of the electorate. If the non-voting 40 million are 
to be made participants, a new political system "based 
on new cleavages and about something new" is neces-
sary. 
What makes the present division between the non-
voter and the voter critical is that in effect they make up 
two communities; the social "haves" and political 
"haves" coincide, as do the social and political "have-
nots." For Schattschneider, the 40 million are not in the 
same contest with the 60 million; the political organiza-
tion of today is only the political organization of the 60 
million. Nor should we be misled by the existence of con-
flict; we have concentrated attention on the cleavage 
within the 60 million to the exclusion of the cleavage be-
tween the two communities. Since support for a major 
shift in policy exists only outside the present electorate, 
this omission is a major flaw. 
Berelson's prime concern was that the political theory 
of democracy accord with present democratic practice 
( see Almond and Verba, 1963: 4 7 5-6). He noted sev-
eral assumptions in democratic theory, such as political 
discussion and strong citizen motivation to participate in 
politics and to be well informed (cf. Davis, 1964). He 
compared these assumptions with findings of empirical 
research about voting behavior, for example, that we talk 
rather than debate, have weak motivation to participate, 
and have low levels of political information. 
His basic thesis was that, while individual voters do 
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not satisfy the requirements of democratic political 
theory, the total membership of the political system does. 
The theory, Berelson said, has been "defective in its con-
centration on the individual citizen" (Berelson et al., 
1954: 312) and it has demanded that citizens possess 
characteristics such as rationality and awareness in too 
extreme a form. A functioning political system requires 
more than participant voters; stability must be assured 
and conflict must be restrained at the same time that 
change occurs. The conflicting requirements of adjustment 
and stability, of conflict and consensus, can be met by a 
distribution of characteristics among the population, ra-
ther than by possession by any one individual ( or all in-
dividuals) of all necessary characteristics ( see Almond 
and Verba, 1963: 479). 
In these terms, the least desirable voters according to 
the requirements of classical democratic theory may be 
helpful in the resolution of political problems through 
low political involvement, which facilitates their chang-
ing policy position and party preference. Those who 
vote least often, who are most erratic and perhaps least 
motivated when they do participate, may nonetheless be 
quite helpful to the system's functioning by contributing 
flexibility. As Glaser ( 1962) pointed out, "Under some 
conditions a successful presidential candidate may break 
even or perhaps lose among the politically more alert 
voters, while winning his majority from the ballots of the 
less interested" (p. 47). 
One of Berelson's conclusions was that we need to ac-
cept the existence of a political division of labor, as 
much as we accept an economic or social one. Some per-
form regular participant tasks with stable, consistent 
views and others perform irregularly with inconsistent, 
unstable views. The non-voter, then, is not an unmiti-
gated evil. In addition, Berelson suggested that a rela-
tively low voting rate shows that the society has ways 
other than the political to resolve its conflicts-that not 
too much stress and strain is being placed on politics to 
solve the society's problems. In Almond's and Verba's 
(1963:475) terms, "The maintenance of other orienta-
tions limits the extent of his commitment to political ac-
tivity and keeps politics, as it were, in its place." 
Further Views, Criticism and Comment 
Schattschneider was not completely clear on the rea-
sons for the existence of such a large segment of what 
Merriam and Gosnell ( 1934) called "habitual non-vot-
ers" in the population. The burden of his argument 
about the need for a change in the agenda of politics was 
that the non-voters are "least involved or most convinced 
the system is loaded" against them, and are the "soft un-
derbelly of the system," the "most likely point of subver-
sion" (Schattschneider, 1960:104). We are "very 
near," he said, "to something like the limit of tolerance 
of passive abstention" (Schattschneider, 1960:120). 
But "passive abstention" is one thing; the more forceful 
"boycott" of which he also speaks is something more 
critical, in that it involves a more active withdrawal from 
participation in the system, possibly on the basis of a de-
cision that there is no real choice between the candidates 
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or that the system can provide nothing for the individual. 
It is at least a matter for debate and investigation, rather 
than of cold fact, that the nonparticipation by such a 
large segment of the population is purposeful, or that, as 
Schattschneider suggested elsewhere, the nonparticipation 
is purposely arranged by the active participants in the 
political system. It is possible that such nonparticipation 
is an unanticipated and unintended result of the behavior 
of the active participants, rather than an anticipated and 
intended one. Schattschneider also seemed to imply that 
the non-voters are non-voters against their will, that they 
are being manipulated. Although recent Negro registra-
tion drives in the South are changing the picture some-
what, it is possible that non-voters have done nothing to 
protest their status as non-voters because they are un-
concerned and do not feel deprived. This view is par-
tially substantiated by McCiosky's (1964: 376) finding 
that the disagreements of those who are unclear about 
democratic ideals are "passive rather than active, more 
the result of political ignorance and indifference than of 
intellectual conviction or conscious identification with an 
'alien' political tendency. Most seem not even to be aware 
of their deviations from the established values." While 
people can be manipulated without being aware of it, it 
does not follow that the nonparticipants or the deprived 
are ipso facto being manipulated. 
A finding of Berelson's study, which is relevant to 
Schattschneider's argument, is that there is agreement on 
issues and rules of the game by the partisans of both par-
ties. ( "Among those with opinions the partisans agree 
on most issues, criteria, expectations, and rules of the 
game." [Berelson et al., 1954: 309].) This does not nec-
essarily mean, however, that there is a conspiracy of the 
"ins" against the "outs," as Schattschneider suggested in 
holding that there are in effect two communities, a politi-
cal and a non-political ( or extra-political) one, within 
the larger society. 
lt may well be that the leaders of the participants take 
advantage of non-voting, by doing little to involve the 
non-voters beyond the usual "get-out-the-vote" attempts 
at election time, and that usually they move to expand 
the electorate when such expansion is to their own ad-
vantage. "It has been a matter of observation in the 
United States and elsewhere that the extension of the 
right to participate in selecting political leaders is often 
produced less by the demands of the excluded than by 
the manipulation of the party leaders" (Lane, 1959: 38, 
citing Schattschneider, 1942: 48). But this action is 
certainly not the same as purposely keeping the vote 
away from a segment of the population large enough to 
overwhelm the leaders; it is to the leaders' advantage to 
court the non-voter, to keep him in mind. The power of 
the potential voter is not measured by the number of 
times the vote is exercised. If the potential voter is taken 
into account, if the leaders of the politically active at-
tempt to listen to "public opinion," then the non-voter 
has some political influence even without exercising the 
franchise. If, as Schattschneider held, the vote itself is 
meaningless, then action taken on behalf of the non-voter 
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may get him more than the vote itself. For the non-vot-
ers, virtual representation may, at certain times, provide 
at least as much "pay-off" as direct representation. 
Schattschneider talked about the difference between 
"consent" and "support," maintaining that the former is 
not sufficient to uphold the system. While non-voters may 
exert a strong brake on political and social change, in 
that account must be taken of them if the potential for 
revolution is not to be created, they may provide sup-
port for the existing system simply by not working against 
it and by defending it against attacks. Schattschneider 
may have been asking for too much of a good thing; too 
much participation might cause additional conflict and 
exert an even more severe brake on action than now ex-
ists. In this connection, Berelson argued that high vot-
ing rates indicate high politicization of the society and a 
highly politicized society relies so heavily on its political 
subsystem for problem solving that the system's stability 
may be threatened. 
At any rate, Schattschneider presented little, if any, 
evidence that the leaders of the politically active are able 
to manipulate political nonparticipants. In addition, it is 
not at all clear that the non-voters are outside the system, 
or in a position to march in and take over. Many of 
them are within the system (social and economic) and 
possess quantities of the goods available within the system, 
but they are in a state of flux or transition between differ-
ent segments of the system. Relative satisfaction within 
the economic and social subsystems may obviate partici-
pation in the political subsystem, particularly where, as 
in the United States, politics is "marginal" and "low-
key." On the other hand, being at least minimally settled 
in the society and economy, that is, possessing minimum 
shelter, food, and protection, may be a prerequisite to 
participation in the polity ( Davies, I 962). While the 
minimum, in some absolute terms, may be possessed by 
nearly all in America, in relative terms many are still 
below the level that is defined for the society as "pover-
ty." This condition and the acquisitive focus of much of 
the society may cause individuals to spend a dispropor-
tionate amount of their time attempting to secure mate-
rial goods, time that thus may be unavailable for political 
participation. 
While numbers of people in the society are alienated 
from it, the non-voters of whom Berelson wrote are fre-
quently within the system and are simply moving about : 
to form new families, new community attachments, or to 
move up ( or down) the socio-economic ladder. The up-
wardly mobile are certainly not disaffected with the so-
ciety for they have accepted the values of higher strata 
within the system and are moving toward them. Schatt-
schneider pointed out that the voting studies showed the 
non-voter as the "poorest" and "least educated" as well 
as the "least well established" in the community. The 
data Berelson provided suggest that some of those not 
established, who provide flexibility in the outcomes of 
elections, are often people moving from working to 
middle, or from lower-middle to upper-middle, class 
status, and are not simply the poorest or least educated. 
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Such non-voters may be temporarily somewhat rootless 
but are certainly quite committed to the values of the so-
ciety and to the political system. In addition, some citi-
zens are non-voters because they are highly satisfied with 
the existing system rather than because of alienation from 
it, or because they feel the country will do equally well 
under either candidate (CampbeU, Gurin, and Miller, 
I 954). 
In addition, many of those who are socially and eco-
nomically "out" do not mind ranking low in socio-eco-
nomic status or do not feel deprived because of their ob-
jective position. If they held the same values and had the 
same aims as those "above" them in the society, how-
ever, they would probably feel deprived. But Hyman 
(I 953; also Lane, ] 963) has pointed out that the expec-
tations of the so-called lower and working classes are dif-
ferent; their goals are less lofty than those of the middle 
and upper classes - and this probably holds true even 
given equal opportunity- although their "lower" aims 
serve to reinforce their present position in the commu-
nity. Schattschneider's statement and Berelson's finding 
that the nonparticipants are of lower social standing is 
somewhat questioned by Lane, with regard to local elec-
tions. The regular voters in these elections, he found, may 
be less "desirable" than the nonparticipants, because, "In 
these elections there may be some substance to the com-
monly expressed view that the highest participant group 
is a machine-dominated clique working for its own ad-
vantage" (Lane, 1959:343). As a result, "Here, then, 
is a situation where the political reserve consists of a dif-
ferent group, including more middle-class, better edu-
cated, 'civic minded' individuals." This finding does not 
really directly challenge the Schattschneider-Berelson 
findings but may require their limitation to national (and 
perhaps state) elections. 
While one of the major burdens of Schattschneider's 
argument was that there are no issues meaningful to the 
present non-voter, he also argued, and thereby partially 
confused the argument, that technical factors may be re-
sponsible for low voting rates. He suggested that it is 
good to pay attention to technical factors as well as to 
the sociological and psychological ones. In a footnote, he 
indicated that the British ballot is the size of a postcard 
compared to our "bedsheets," and that we vote in many 
elections for many more officials, including insignificant 
ones. The technical factors with which Merriam and 
Gosnell ( 1934) dealt, such as lack of residence required 
for registration and inadequacy of absentee voter provi-
sions, might thus be critical in establishing a pattern of 
non-voting, at least for some potential voters. 
Schattschneider assumed that the distribution of non-
voters is radically different from the distribution of vot-
ers, in terms of preference for particular policies. This 
assumption was probably necessary to his argument that 
simultaneous intervention in the political system by large 
numbeFs of nonparticipants would be a "revolution." If 
the distribution of preference among the non-voters is 
not radically different from that among those who vote 
regularly, then the intervention of the former might not 
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make a significant difference in the compos1t1on of the 
participant group. However, intervention by nonpartici-
pants is not likely to be random or uniform among these 
opinions; different segments will intervene at different 
times. A parallel situation is pointed out by Key ( 1956: 
143) : "the Democratic following consists in the main 
of persons less disposed to vote than are Republicans;" 
intervention of a small percentage of infrequently voting 
Democrats in an election could produce a crucial differ-
ence in the resu lt. If the nonparticipants do differ in views 
from the regular participants, excluding them may be a 
greater danger than allowing them to enter the game; 
participation itself will tend to socialize the newcomers: 
Although the attitudes and interests of the groups 
from which the newcomers to national politics may 
come are out of harmony with the general values of a 
tolerant democratic society, the risks to society of 
withdrawal by these members of the political reserve 
is greater than the risks of participation. The very act 
of participation tends to create bonds of identification 
between the participant and the society. ( Lane, 1959: 
344) 
However, one of my students has suggested that the non-
voters tend to support the political party in power, rather 
than to oppose the system, and that they shift their pref-
erences in line with shifts in occupancy of the White 
House. He cited data (from Campbell, Converse, Stokes, 
and Miller, 1960: 111) showing non-voters moving from 
an 82 %-18 % Democratic preference in 1948 to a 
72%-28% Republican preference eight years later. The 
student then commented: 
Preference of the non-voters in 1948 after 16 years 
of Democratic administration was over four to one 
Democratic Similarly, their preference in 1956 after 
four years of Republican rule was nearly three to one 
Republican. The non-voter, in other words, shows a 
strong preference for the party in power. 
It would seem to me that if the non-voter felt that 
the system was loaded against him, he would show his 
displeasure for the party then in power. At least, I 
would not expect him to show overwhelming support 
for the party presently symbolizing the system (Jacob-
son, 1964). 
One or two additional points ought to be made about 
Schattschneider's argument. He called for a politics based 
on "something new." Yet, whatever the new issues, they 
might be presented in the same way that older and (for 
Schattschneider) inadequate issues have been presented. 
Perhaps it was the way the issues are presented that dis-
turbed Schattschneider. Yet he was by no means clear 
which of the two alternatives (new issues or new man-
ner of presentation) would provide the solution to the 
problem posed, or, if each would, which would be the 
more effective. Despite this lack of clarity, Schattschneid-
er's point about the need for something new seems to 
have its validity. "The more salient and clear-cut the is-
sue, the more likely that a group will react in terms of 
its defined interest" (Lipset, Lazarsfeld, Barton, and 
Linz, 1954: 1170). And the ambiguousness of demo-
cratic politics means that issues are not frequently pre-
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sented in a salient and clear-cut" manner. if they are 
not, then it is unlikely that even part of the non-voters 
can be moved from their present habit of nonpartici-
pation. "A sharp break in a traditional continuity by a 
sub-group can occur only when some experience is per-
ceived as clearly affecting their interests and requiring a 
new political organization" (Lipset et al., 1954: 1170). 
In addition, emphasis only on increasing the proportion 
of those voting, without attention to other types of partic-
ipation or the quality of participation, seems inadequate. 
Voting, because it is minimal political participation, does 
not necessarily mean involvement in the system, but may 
take place out of force of habit, which is certainly not the 
same as the involvement Schattschneider said is needed. 
Therefore, lowering barriers to participation in voting 
would not necessarily produce a change in the character 
or quality of participation. More certainly, the solution 
is needed to problems of non-participation in our politi-
cal system. 
Let us now turn our attention somewhat more directly 
to Berelson. First of all, his position concerning the posi-
tive functions of lower participation, while perhaps repre-
sentative of the thinking of some students of political 
behavior, is not representative of the dominant view in 
the population at large. From the point of view of the 
classical model of democracy, the least (politically) edu-
cated ( our "nonparticipants") should not vote. Children 
are taught in schools that the good citizen should be an 
aware and informed one, and my college students sug-
gest frequently, and not unrepresentatively, that one 
should not vote unless he is informed. 
As stated by Lane, "It certainly is not clear that in-
creased participation without an appropriate background 
of interest and involvement benefits either the participant 
himself or the society of which he is a member" (1959: 
343). That many of those who do not fit the model, do 
not in fact participate in the system, may be functional 
for the system and may continue to reinforce the model 
for many people. 
Democratic viability is . . . saved by the fact that 
those who are most confused about democratic ideas 
are so likely to be politicaIJy apathetics and without 
significant influence . . . 
Apathy also furnishes its own partial corrective by 
keeping the doubters from acting upon their differ-
ences ( McClosky, 1964: 3 7 6). 
However, this was not the burden of Berclson's argu-
ment, as we have pointed out in our earlier summary of 
his position. 
For Berelson, an amount of non participation was an in-
dication, and a good one, that the society is not fully poli-
ticized, that other ways of problem solving beside the po-
litical exist ( although problems may still go unsolved), 
and that therefore the political system is not burdened 
with having to solve all of society's problems. The con-
verse might be indicated by a high rate of voting. How-
ever, the meaninglessness of the voting act for the indi-
vidual voter weakens the force of his argument. If "for 
the bulk of the American people the voting decision is 
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not followed by any direct, immediate, visible personal 
consequences" (Berelson et al., 1954:314-5), and if the 
voting act is not very meaningful under present condi-
tions, then an increase in the voting rate, even a substan-
tial one, would not per se mean full politicization of the 
society or increased reliance on the po1ity for the solu-
tion of the society's problems. 
While Schattschneider seemed unclear what weight to 
give technical factors as a cause of non-voting, Berelson 
clearly ignored them. His interpretation of non-voting 
may have been biased because of failure to evaluate tech-
nical reasons for non-voting as well as socio-economic 
correlates of non-voting. If people cannot vote because 
they do not fulfill certain legal requirements, they are not 
very likely to have any interest in the election; it would 
be interest invested to little avail. It may be that those 
of lower socio-economic status are less involved politi-
cally and might thus be less likely to vote even if regis-
tered, or if eligible to register, but this is hypothesis, not 
finding. Berelson, however, did state that the complexity 
of polrtical problems ( which might be taken to inciude 
such things as the long ballot) is relevant to the voting 
decision, but he suggested that it only changes the de-
terminants of voting instead of producing non-voting. 
Increasing nationalization of politics in America raises 
a serious question of the requirements of the theory of 
democracy. Classical theories of democracy, with their 
emphasis on rational discussion and debate, were based 
on the small community. just as Berelson's study was 
based on one city. In our system, grossly larger than the 
Greek city-state, we have provided some substitutes for 
face-to-face communication across vast geographic ex-
panses, but we have provided very few substitutes for 
continuous feedback and interchange that debate and dis-
cussion provide. Berelson's attention to the single com-
munity may obscure some of this. Yet even at the local 
level, the changes in the structure of our life situation 
have altered the form and substance of political com-
munication. And, when we do communicate, we talk, not 
debate. "On the grass roots level there was more talk 
than debate ... " (Berelson et al., 1954:308). If we 
do not debate even on the local level, we are not likely to 
be able to do so on the national level, except perhaps 
for such special events as the extremely stylized debates 
between Kennedy and Nixon or through interchanges 
between syndicated columnists. 
Berelson did not deal explicitly with methods for pro-
viding more effective communication, yet his data pointed 
to a way in which the requirement of rationality within 
the political system might be partially, although indirect-
ly, satisfied. While political preferences are "relatively in-
vulnerable to direct argumentation," they are "vulnerable 
to indirect social influences" (Bcrelsonet al., 1954:311). 
The specific requirement of rational discussion ( or "de-
bate") may not be fulfilled, or what debate occurs may 
have little effect, but the "wilder" ideas may be filtered 
out because they do not get enough acceptance to be so-
cially reinforced. This can reduce the amount of trial-
and-error necessary in policy-making or in political de-
cision-making generally . The members of the polity may 
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be somewhat protected from manipulation by this re-
quirement that "indirect social influences" operate be-
fore an idea will be accepted, because the elites then can-
not easily manipulate isolated individuals. New alterna-
tives must receive acceptance among (large) numbers of 
people before they can become the basis for action. An 
idea is less likely to be reinforced by the social environ-
ment if only one in every two hundred people holds it 
than if one in every 20 do; the more frequent contact 
between people with the same idea in the latter condition 
may start a spiral of acceptance. What this means is that 
the threshold for acceptance of new alternatives is higher 
than if political preferences changed solely in response 
to direct argument, but once this threshold is reached, 
the alternative may become more firmly implanted and 
thus more resistant to change in the short run. 
Berelson and Schattschneider agreed that there has 
been an overestimation by classical democratic theorists 
of the abilities and contributions by the individual, but 
disagree as to who will supply these deficiences. Schatt-
schneider wrote, "All classical concepts of democracy 
have overestimated the strength and universality of the 
self-generated impulse of people to participate in the life 
of the political community" ( 1960: 111). Somewhat dif-
ferently, Berelson stated, "Individual voters today seem 
unable to satisfy the requirements for a democratic sys-
tem of government outlined by political theorists" (Berel-
son et al., 1954: 312). Perhaps the biggest question raised 
concerning the theory of democracy by these two state-
ments is, "Where will the burden for success of the dem-
ocratic system rest?" 
Berelson devoted much of his analysis to this point. 
He said that classical theory demanded too much of the 
individual voter and suggested that the system as a whole 
bear the burden, with individuals taken collectively ful-
filling requirements that none ( or few) could fulfill in-
dividually. But his general argument did not remove the 
burden of fulfilling the requirements; instead, it shifted 
them, and, while answering one set of questions, posed 
and left unanswered a second set. He seemed to shift the 
burden from the individual citizen to ( 1) the non-voter 
and (2) the opinion leader. While high politicization and 
constant demands on the political system to solve the so-
ciety's problems may tear the system apart if the de-
mands are continued for long times, and while the less 
involved or uninvolved voter may provide short-run flexi-
bility, Berelson was not clear on what is to happen when 
either sudden demands or constant demands deriving 
from crisis situations are made upon the system. If the 
individual voter does not fulfill classical democratic 
norms, and the uninvolved voter provides short-run flex-
ibility, who is to provide strength over the long run? If 
people can be involved in the political system with only 
the difficulty that Berelson seemed to suggest ( with the 
need for reinforcement from primary groups), where is 
the reserve that may be needed? Even if one grants, with 
Bcrelson, that the existence of numbers of non-voters 
provides slack to be taken up during periods of crisis, 
what happens when the slack is taken up completely? 
f have referred to the "short-run" flexibility provided 
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by the relatively uninvolved potential elector. He can 
move with certain of the demands placed on the society. 
Berelson, however, did not fully suggest what happens to 
these people in the long run. Without doubt, some of 
them do put down roots, in new communities, in new 
socio-economic strata, and with this, their vote stabilizes. 
Some may be temporary "defectors," who will return to 
the fold in the next election. But some may become per-
manent "shifters," always vacillating. When decisive ac-
tion is required, these may contribute to instability rather 
than to stability. Theory must be concerned with the 
long-run continuance of the democratic system, as well 
as with its short-run maintenance. 
In addition to placing the burden of operation of the 
democratic system on the uninvolved citizen, Berelson 
also counted heavily on the opinion leader for the sys-
tem's success. This is the individual who most closely 
meets the requirements established by democratic theory: 
'The classical requirements are more appropriate for the 
opinion leaders in the society, but even they do not meet 
them directly" (Berelson et al., 1954: 322-3). The sys-
tem depends on the opinion leaders, a set of individuals 
far smaller than the total potential electorate, for the 
transmission of ideas, for the filtering of communications 
transmitted by the candidates and office-holders, and for 
the reinforcement of ideas, particularly the latter (Key, 
1961 :51-3). The existence of these individuals provides 
a prop to classical theory; the existence of rational types 
who appear to approximate the older definition of "inde-
pendent voter" ( with their ability to communicate and 
rationalize so that they appear to delay voting decisions 
until the last moment) makes it difficult for many to see 
that the formal theory of democracy and its practice di-
verge considerably. 
Classical democratic theory at least had the virtue of 
relying on all men in the community because it assumed 
that "there is such a thing as 'the' typical citizen on whom 
uniform requirements can be imposed," and that most 
citizens were typical. Berelson, by placing the burden on 
the opinion leader, in effect leaves democracy at the 
mercy of a much smaller number of individuals. If they 
fail in their functions of communication, filtering, and 
reinforcement, finding their replacements will be extreme-
ly difficult. 
Summary 
In brief, my main criticisms of the two approaches to 
the subject of nonvoting are as follows: It remains to be 
proved that non-voters are such against their will or that 
they are manipulated by the existing elite. That a large 
number of people are habitual non-voters does not nec-
essarily indicate the existence of a separate non- or ex-
tra-political community, cut off from the political com-
munity. Even those who do not participate may provide 
support for the political system. Not all the non-partici-
pants are found in the lowest strata in the community, 
nor do they have political values totally different from 
those of the more regular participants. Geographical and 
soda! mobility, caused in part by our society's prosper-
ity, may be an important factor in causing non-voting. 
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A high rate of voting does not necessarily mean high 
politicization if the voting act itself is relatively meaning-
less or is only minimal political participation. Agreement 
that classical democratic theory has overemphasized the 
role of the individual "ideal-typical" citizen shifts the 
burden of support from the average citizen either to the 
less motivated, less-well-educated individual, or to the 
relatively smaH number of opinion leaders who are our 
closest approximation of the democratic ideal. While 
short-run flexibility may be provided by the relatively un-
involved, problems of long-run strength of the system 
still remain to be solved. 
Perhaps the most brief and direct statement upon 
which I can end this critique is this: more research is 
needed into non-voting - perhaps the examination of 
some of the points suggested here. However, with or 
without this research, we need to devote more thought 
to restatements of democratic theory so that the goals 
theory establishes will be felt to be possible of attain-
ment. In this restatement, we must continue to try to 
adopt the classical democratic theory of the city-state 
to the grossly larger and more complex environment in 
which we now find ourselves, a setting that requires, as 
a result of the Industrial Revolution, a much more in-
volved set of equipment, if it is to be operated properly. 
Non-voting is not a problem to be dismissed; we must 
at least make certain that the citizen "does have the po-
tential to act if there is need" (Almond and Verba, 
1963 :481), even if we do not require him to be "con-
stantly involved in politics" or actively "to oversee the 
behavior of political decision makers." 
Political functions must be performed, and we want 
them performed well; therefore, we must see to it that 
even if each and every citizen is not equipped to play 
all requisite political roles, enough citizens play each 
role so that, through a highly interrelated system, our po-
litical work is accomplished. 
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